introduced a model in which two basic motives to action are understood as different type of preferences and represented by a comprehensive utility function: the first is consequentialist motivation, whereas the second is a conditional willingness to conform with an ideal, or a moral principle, which they call a conformist, or ideal, motive to action. A moral ideal is meant as a normative principle of evaluation for collective modes of behaviours which provides agents with a ranking of states of affairs resulting from strategic interaction expressing a greater or lesser consistency with the ideal. The principle moreover is seen as resulting from a (possibly hypothetical) contract between the agents involved in the interaction in an ex-ante phase. Thus, the normative principle boils down to a social welfare function that measures the consistency of outcomes with the normative prescriptions provided by the ideal. Hence, agents understand their own and any other agent's degree of conformity in terms of their contribution to carrying out the ideal given the others' expected action, and a person's own motivation to act in conformity with the principle increases with others' (expected) conformity. In other words, individual conformity with the principle is conditional on others' conformity with it, as perceived by the agent. This peculiar feature of reciprocity over others' behaviour calls for an extension of the usual equipment of decision theory, which is provided by the theory of Psychological Games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) .
Conformist preferences and the game of reference

Background theory.
Contrary to the economist's fixation with the model of rational economic man seen as uniquely selfish utility maximiser, a more reasonable and realistic understanding of rational action suggests that individuals weight different, possibly conflicting, motives to act. On the hypothesis that economic agents are motivated both by consequentialist (and mainly selfinterested) and "conformist" preferences -that is the intrinsic motivation to act according to shared principles complied reciprocally by also the other interacting agents -Grimalda and Sacconi (2002, 2005a, 2005b) suggested that two classes of motives for choice can be grasped by two types of preferences of the Self and by their relative mathematical representation in the corresponding part of a comprehensive utility function. Thus, the utility maximisation model of rational economic man can be considerably revised, extending its explanatory and normative power at a substantial level. In this paper we describe the results of an experiment designed to test the explanatory capacity of Sacconi and Grimalda's model of choice. This first subsection summarises the theory because it furnishes also the hypotheses for the experimental study reported thereafter.
The model assumes what we call a description relative view point of motives to act. The same states of affairs generated by strategic interaction can be described in different ways according to their relevant characteristics. A first description of states views them as consequences.
Consequences may be described as attributed only to the acting Self -what happens to the decision-maker in any state. This description is the basis of Self-interest: the Self defines preferences over consequences, which are Self-referred. By contrast, consequences may be attributed to any person (extended consequences) in so far as they can be understood as consisting in what happens to any whatever individual. To make sense of any impartial consequentialist ethics like utilitarianism, or altruism, consequences must be extended like that. In general, if a player defines his preferences only on states described as consequences, then he has consequentialist personal preferences.
The second type of preferences is what we call conformist personal preferences. Description of states is no less important here, but they are now described as sets of interdependent actions played by the participants in any generic game (call such an action profile σ), characterised in terms of whether or not they are consistent with a given abstract principle.
First, the principle can be captured by a function of individual first type utilities attached to states which measures the fairness of welfare distribution in each state of the world. A pattern of behaviours (a vector of strategies) is defined as perfectly deontological if it is fully consistent with the abstract principle of fairness -that is, if it maximises the function just defined. We call this state the ideal. Hence, the fairness function generates an ordering of states in terms of their consistency to the principle. Secondly, we then determine the individual degree of conformity with the ideal relative to each strategy choice of any player by seeing whether and how much the ideal comes about through that choice of the player, given what he believes about other parties' choices. Moreover the motivational weight of this conformity to the player himself depends on the expected reciprocal conformity of the other players given what they expect on the part of the first player. In fact, for each strategy combination, the intensity of each player's conformist preference will depend on a measure of expected reciprocal conformity, which is based on: It follows that conformist preferences rest upon a measure of reciprocal conformity with the ideal, which on the other hand depends on a principle-based ordering of states according to a deontological property they possess. There is an indubitable relation between the two kinds of preferences -consequentialist and conformist. In fact, in order to define fairness, we look at distributions of the payoffs deriving from the first type of preference -i.e. material utilities.
But this does not reduce second-type preferences to first-type ones. First-type utilities are no more than rough materials for the criterion defining second-type preferences. What matters for the second description are not consequences or material payoffs as such, but a distributive property defined over payoffs, which is expressed by the function representing a principle of fairness.
Thus characterisation of second-type preferences accords more with deontology than consequentialism. The more an expected state of affairs is consistent with the ideal, the more an individual action belonging to it is preferred by a player (granted that the player contributes to generating the state and he expects that the other player reciprocally contribute in the same way). Moreover, there is no reason to link deontology with a belief that there is some objective source of value that has ontological reality "out there" (independently of the decision maker's affections). In fact, while conformist preferences depend on degrees of deontology, deontology itself may nonetheless be understood, as it is here, simply as individual compliance with a fair distribution principle that players could have rationally agreed in an ex ante hypothetical bargaining situation .
Once these concepts have been translated into a formal model, a player's comprehensive utility function consisting of two parts (which we assume to be separable), i.e. the representations of consequentialist and conformist preferences, can be defined as
where U i is the traditional player's i "consequentialist" utility for state σ (a given strategy combination of any generic game), the weight λ i -which may be any positive real numberis an exogenous psychological parameter that expresses how important the conformist component is within the motivational system of player i (we could call it the player's i 'maximum disposition to act according to conformist reasons', granted that certain conditions do apply), and F is a function representing reciprocal conformity with principle T which in turn is a function taking a value for each state σ.
First required is specification of a form of the fairness-function T which formally represents the ideal. This must be a mapping from the set of states (and first-order utilities attached to them) to a fairness ordering ranging over states. A characterisation in contractarian terms of the ideal principle T is given by the Nash bargaining solution, i.e. the Nash social welfare function N (or Nash product)
where c i represents the reservation utility that agents can obtain when the process of bargaining breaks down. Second, as far as the function F is concerned, defined are two personal indexes of conformity, which will be compounded in a measure of mutual expected conformity. It will and enter the utility functions of the players in so far as it will influence the weight of the conformist motivation within the individuals system of preferences. 1 In this construction we take the point of view of player i (any other player j's perspective is symmetrical).
Player i's personal index of conformity:
This is player i's degree of deviation from the ideal principle T (which varies from 0 to -1 
From this formula we may state the following: if player i perfectly conforms with the ideal, given her expectation, while the player j is also expected to perfectly conform, then the two individual indexes take zero values, so that the resulting utility value due to conformism is λ i .
By contrast, if a player does not entirely conform, while not expecting the other player entirely to conform either, then the two indexes take negative values (possibly −1). Thus the utility calculation for conformist reasons reduces to (1−x)(1−y) (possibly both equal to zero) times the weight λ i and yields less than λ i (possibly zero) as the conformist utility value.
The comprehensive utility function V i , hence, takes the form of the linear combination of the two components, with reference to each state described in terms of both the individual strategy choice and the individual beliefs system over the other player's strategy choice (note that in equilibrium beliefs meet choices, so that a belief accurately describes what the other player does)
, ,
This suggests that if a player predicts reciprocal conformism (so that conformist motivation effectively enters the utility function with weight λ i ), as long as the weight λ i is high enough, it is possible that the overall utility function reverses the preference for a strategy choice σ i.
with respect to the same player i's simple consequentialist preferences represented by U i (σ i , b i ). For example, it may induce the players to select strategies that they would never have chosen if they had relied on their material utility only.
A reference situation: the Exclusion Game
Conformist preferences account for ideal-driven choices based on the motivational force of reciprocal conformity with impartial and impersonal abstract principles of fairness. Hence it seems natural to use them in an attempt to explain behaviours such that a decision of fairly including a weak party in the sharing of benefits is taken by a group of strong players. The stylized situations of reference is one where "inclusion" is due not to the attitudes (or intentions) expressed through effective interaction by the weak toward the strong parties (kindness, friendship, spontaneous cooperation and the like, which may affect their welfare position), but simply is a decision taken out of a sense of commitment. In other words strong players recognise an intrinsic value in reciprocating (amongst themselves) conformity with a principle of fairness. The typical situation is a social interaction between strong players and a weak player such that their mutual interaction makes a social surplus affordable, but only the strong players have decision influence over the allocation and distribution of the social surplus, whereas the weak party has neither a voice in this decision nor any retaliation threat at her disposal. Strong players can then decide to include the weak player in the fair sharing of the surplus, or alternatively to exclude the weak player and share out the pie among themselves. This is why we call this situation the "Exclusion Game". Of course, one should not forget the role of reciprocity. Nevertheless reciprocity in this case cannot have anything to do with "intentions" showed by the weak party, which in fact is so weak that it can be represented as a dummy player, i.e. a player with no move in the game, and hence incapable to show intention through actions. On the contrary reciprocity in conforming with a fairness principle works through the preferences of the group of players with decision influence and concerns their reciprocal conformity with the fairness ideal. Explanation of their inclusive behaviour does not involve any kindness, reciprocity, direct interaction or attitude whatsoever
shown by the weak player toward the strong ones. In short, strong players' inclusive behaviour is born out of a 'sense of commitment', it amounts to 'noblesse oblige' .
In order to give a formal description of the exclusion game, we consider a situation (a noncooperative game) in which two individuals (player 1 and player 2) must decide how to allocate a sum of money R among themselves and a third individual (player 3), who does not have an active role in the allocation decision but whose payoff is determined by the choices made by the two other players (active players). In particular, active players can choose between two alternative strategies: first, asking for a large share of R, i.e. high demand, 
As shown in figure 1 , if both the active players decide to ask for half of the total sum R (high demand strategies), the third player's payoff is zero; if one of the two active players decides to ask for only one third of R , while the other one chooses to ask for half of R, third player's payoff is R/6. An equal division of R among all the players -including the dummy third player -(R/3 each), results when players 1 and 2 ask for only R/3.
Given the assumption that player 3 is dummy, as far as we maintain that the players are motivated only by the intent to maximise their material payoffs, the only equilibrium in dominant strategies of this game is the one in which both active players choose to ask for
Thus, the Exclusion Game played by self-interested players will induce effective exclusion of the player with no influence on the allocation decision. This is only a preparatory move, however. The next section illustrates how matters changes when conformist preferences and reciprocity among the active players enter the picture..
The exclusion game under conformist preferences and reciprocity.
In order to apply the theory of conformist preferences to the Exclusion Game, we must first re-describe states of affairs resulting from the game in terms of their consistency to the ideal of fairness formalised as the Nash bargaining solution (or Nash product) (where it is assumed that the status quo is zero for each player). This we assume to be the principle of fairness agreed upon by all the players (active or otherwise) in an hypothetical (i.e. not externally enforceable) agreement.
On applying the Nash product to the states resulting from the possible plays of our game we obtain the following fairness ordering of the four strategy combinations
We can use these values to compute the overall utility values on the basis of the conformity indexes for each pair of actions and for the relative beliefs. In this new context the appropriate notion of equilibrium is that of Psychological Nash Equilibrium (Geanakoplos et al. (1989) 2 ), which is an extension of the Nash equilibrium for situations in which expectations enter the player's utility function.
Accordingly, given the players utilities defined as function of their beliefs, we can easily compute the psychological equilibria of the game played by agents with conformist preferences. Strategy combinations that were not Nash equilibria in the basic game can now be defined as psychological equilibria. In particular, (
is a psychological equilibrium once it is granted that the weights λ i are sufficiently high:
Put otherwise: given the vector of strategies ( from the decision to comply with the ideal. Under these conditions there exists a psychological equilibrium of the game such that players 1 and 2 choose to ask for the lowest share of the total sum that guarantees an equal distribution of R among all three players. Thus, one of the equilibrium solutions of the psychological Exclusion Game is the effective inclusion of the third inactive party in the sharing of the surplus. In the event that players have strong preferences for reciprocal conformity with the hypothetical social contract ideal of fairness, and if they have consistent reciprocal beliefs in that regard, a solution may be inclusion, not exclusion.
Note, however, that this strategy combination is not the only equilibrium of the game: also
is a psychological equilibrium when a system of beliefs exists such that both player 1 and 2 predict with probability 1 that nobody will conform with the principle, in that they have higher-order beliefs coherent with this expectation. In particular, if player 1 believes that the opponent will choose the worst action with regard to the moral principle (first order belief), and if he also believes that player 2 believes that 1 will choose the same action (second order belief), neither the opponent nor player 1 have incentives to respect the moral principle by acting against their material self-interest.
In the following sections, after having introduced the experimental design and procedure (sec.
2), we will show (sec.3) how this model can be used to formulate predictions about the choices made by subjects involved in the experiment.
Experimental design and procedure
The experiment took place at the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento and it consisted of six sessions with 15 subjects, for a total of 90 participants.
3 Each subject received a show-up fee of € 5 for participation.
Each session was divided into three phases and lasted one hour on average.
In phase one the subjects played a version of the Exclusion Game. They were assigned to groups composed of three members. Within each group, subjects were randomly attributed the roles of G1 and G2 and G3. G1 and G2 were invited to play a game in which they had to decide how to allocate a sum of money (S= €12) between themselves and the third player, who did not have any active role in the game. In particular, active players were able to decide how much of the sum to ask for themselves (d1, d2), selecting one of three possible strategies:
25%, 33% or 50% of S. Active players' payoffs corresponded to d1 and d2, while the third player's payoff was S-(d1+d2) ( Figure 2 ).
The subjects played the game three times, in three different rounds. At the beginning of each round the three roles were randomly assigned to the members of the group. The selection mechanism was designed so that each player was able to take each of the three roles G1, G2
and G3 in turn. The subjects were told that at the end of the experiment the software would extract one of these three rounds at random, and the player's earning for phase 1 would be determined according to the outcome of that round. 4 The game was played anonymously and subjects were not aware of the previous rounds' outcome. This procedure produced two observations for each player in this phase: his choice in the G1 role and his choice in the G2
role. That is for each player we have two rounds of observable choice at phase one. In phase two the subjects were assigned to new groups consisting of three anonymous members. Without definition of roles, they were invited to agree upon an hypothetical rule for the allocation of a sum between two active players and one non-active player by means of a voting procedure. The agreement was to be reached by repeatedly playing the voting procedure until unanimity was reached, within a given limit of trials. No explicit communication was allowed among the players of any given group. In particular, after they were informed that in the following phase they would play a game like the one played in the first phase, they were requested to vote for one of two general principles and one among some more specific rules deduced from the selected general principle (Figure 3 ). Subjects were told that groups which reached unanimous agreement by voting for the same principle within five trials would pass to the voting on the specific allocation rule, upon which the groups had to agree within ten trials. A lack of unanimity after the last of the trials would prevent subjects from entering the third phase.
At the beginning of this phase the experimenters informed the subjects about the voting procedure, stressing the correspondence between the specific rules and the game strategies of phases one and three. Absolute anonymity was guaranteed and the subjects were not allowed to communicate throughout the procedure.
5
In phase three, with the composition of the group unchanged, G1, G2 and G3 roles were randomly assigned to the members of each group that agreed upon a given principle.
The subjects were involved in the same game as in the first phase, but now active players had the additional option of choosing between implementing the rule that they had agreed in the second phase or choosing one of the alternative strategies. If a player decided to implement the rule, then the corresponding strategy would be automatically selected, otherwise the strategy would be removed from his strategy set. Thus, for example, if player i was part of a group that in the second phase had reached agreement on rule 1.2 in figure 3 and if in phase three, playing the role of G1, he decided to implement that rule, then strategy '4' was automatically selected.
5 See Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the voting procedure.
PRINCIPLE 1.
Every player should share the benefits, in particular, who has not the possibility to choose
should not receive less then
People who play under a decisional role could claim a higher share of benefits.
G1 G2 G3
1.1 33% 25% 42%
1.2 25% 33% 42%
1.3 33% 33% 33%
2.1 50% 25% 17% 2.2 33% 50% 17%
2.3 50% 50% 0
Figure 3: Second phase. Principles and rules
Principles Rules
Just after their choice, active players were asked to express their expectation about the opponent's behaviour by guessing the outcome of the game. 6 Data on the number of subjects that chose to implement the rule were collected and communicated to active players, who were asked to play again, in the same roles, using the same procedure as adopted at the beginning of the third phase, without knowing the outcome of the previous game.
At the end of the third phase, earnings were computed and players were paid. The total earning corresponded to the payoff of the extracted round of the first phase plus the payoff of the two games played in the third phase.
Then subjects were asked to fill out a short questionnaire on their explanation for doing certain decisions during the experiments. (see appendix 4).
A scheme of the experimental procedure is given in figure 4 . The correspondence between the structure of the theory under control and the experimental design should be clear. In the first phase players enter the game without being able to agree upon a general principle of division. 6 We asked the player to indicate the cell of the payoff matrix in which he thought the game would end. In this way we avoided explicitly asking for his opinion about the opponent's willingness to conform with the rule. 
ROUND 2 Within each group:
-G1, G2 and G3 roles are assigned.
-G1 and G2 play the game
ROUND 3
Within each group:
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 (WHITIN EACH GROUP)
G1 AND G2 PLAY SECOND TIME THE GAME (IMPLEMENT THE RULE OR
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES)
The second phase corresponds to the "constitutional" step. Here the players can agree on both a general principle and a specific rule for the division of the sum. Note that one of the rules, the (33%, 33%, 33%) one, corresponds to the outcome of the game in which the Nash welfare function is maximised.
Playing this phase does not produce payoffs as such, because it only involves agreement on the rule that may be used to resolve a game later on, when the players will again have complete freedom of choice relative to the strategy to be implemented. However failure in the constitutional process is costly, because it prevents players from accessing the last phase, in which they can earn an additional sum of money.
The choice between the two principles should not be interpreted as simply a choice between moral conduct and pure amoral, and intrinsically censurable, self-interested behaviour. In fact, the inclusionist and exclusionist principles have been presented as if they express two alternative, but nevertheless admissible, positions. In the case of inclusion, the allocation of the benefits is assumed to be independent of the active role played by the subjects in the game (i.e. it sees as morally inapprorpiate as a basis for judgent whether the player holds the power to exclude or not); in the case of exclusion, the principle of equal distribution takes as relevant the active roles in the interaction and hence it is appliyed only within the acive players set.
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In the third phase, the same players, after they have reached agreement on a division rule, are again involved in the Exclusion Game for two times. First they can choose whether or not to implement the rule they agreed. They are completely free to make a decision contrary to their previous agreement on a rule. In fact, even though agreement has been reached, at this stage its benefits are over, and the subjects are asked to look forward to the exclusion game as a new phase of the experiement. Hence, if the subjects have purely consequentialistic orientation they will forget everything about the agreed principles or rules, and will concentrate on the possible outcomes of the exclusion game understood simply as consequences (material payoff). Otherwise considering the agreed principles and rules (and beliefs about compliace by other players) clearly denotes a deontological orientation. Asking the players about their expectations concerning the outcome of the game enabled us to deduce the players' beliefs about the opponent's willingness to conform with the rule. Finally, by asking the subjects to play the game again, after they had been told the percentage of people who had decided to implement the rule, we wanted to test the effect of such information on the players' beliefs and choices.
Empirical predictions and results.
Empirical predictions
What should we expect the results of the experiment to be if we assume that the players had conformist preferences?
The answer to this question is provided by direct application of the model presented in section 1.1. We begin by applying the Nash bargaining function to the outcomes of the game used in the experiment (2). One could criticise our decision not to sharpen the moral distinction between the self-interested rule of conduct and the other-regarding rule of conduct. On the other hand, were the choice framed as one between a moral principle and an amoral behaviour at all some reader would have been right in suggesting that we could have induced the subjects' choice by means of some interiorised cultural norm, not letting then to be free in agreeing on the constitutional principle they see more fit for this situation.
To sum up, those who chose the 'only-the-active-players-have-a-legitimate-claim-to-a-share-of-the-pie' principle showed to adhere to a sort of 'moral egoism' based on the intuition that only having effective influence on the result legitimise a claim (something like 'to whichever according to his power'). On the other hand those who chose the 'equal division' principle realised that being one of the participants in the choice over the constitution taken under a veil of ignorance concerning whether a player will be active or dummy, which will allows, once agreed, to proceed to play the division game, legitimise an equal claim on the final distribution no matter the random selection (by a natural lottery) of the role the players will take later on.
Hence, from the conformity indexes attached to each outcome of the game, we can compute the individual comprehensive utility values, assuming that in each state the players' beliefs reciprocally predict exactly the strategy chosen by the opponent. These values are reported in Figure 6 . In phase 1, players have no information about the type of their opponents, nor can they refer to any pre-existing agreement about the way in which the game should be played. Thus, there is no basis for conformist preferences (there is no agreed principle to comply with nor any reason to expect compliance by the counterpart). Even though the players could in principle have a high level of i λ , this weight simply remains inactive. We should therefore expect players, even those with high conformist disposition, to believe that their opponents will choose the strategy that maximises their own self-material interest, and consequently will ask for € 6 (50% of S).
Prediction 1.
In phase one, the choices of players motivated by conformist preferences will not be different from the choices of self-interested players. We will consequently find that they choose strategy '6'.
In the second phase players must choose a rule on how to play an hypothetical Exclusion
Game that may be played at a later moment. They know that if they are able to agree upon some principle of division, they will be able to play the Exclusion Game later, even though In this setting, 'equal distribution' is also an intuitively obvious choice, i.e. one with high 'salience'. Given that agreement in this phase is a necessary condition for accessing the third phase, players may vote for the most salient rule to co-ordinate their choices in a limited number of trials. Salience, of course, may depend on the simplicity of the symmetric distribution; on the other hand, cognitive simplicity may also be connected to the fairness of equal division. Whether the cognitive simplicity or the intuitive fairness of a symmetric distribution comes first is difficult to say. We are here tempted to say that the cognitive and ethical features of symmetry are quite interlocked.
However, we must remind that available to conformist players at this step is also an agreement over the 'the powerful players get all the pie' principle, which notwithstanding its crudeness is a possible second principle of division. Hence, we cannot uniquely predict that conformist players will choose the equal division principle. Conformity enters the picture only once a principle has been chosen in the constitutional phase, whereas the nature of the specific principle chosen depend on the proper understanding of the contractarian nature of the constitutional phase, which is independent of conformity per se. (We might say that also a constitutional choice of the "egoist" principle, even though it may reflect a misunderstanding of the symmetry of the contractarian choice, once it were made and conformed to, would be consistent with the model of conformist preferences). Thus we can only predict from our normative model of the constitutional nature of the decision phase over principles, that the equal division principle will have some intuitive force. Note that this is also a methodological necessity if the experiment must be able to test in effective way the hypothesis of conformist preferences. In fact, should conformist players -which at the first step decided to act out of their simple self-interest -decide at the second step uniquely to agree over "the powerful take all the pie" principle, and then going on by deciding to comply with this principle, then no evidence of change in the players' behaviours could be observed through the experiment, since self-interest and conformity would dictate the same behaviour. No falsification could be provided this way against the conformist hypothesis. On the other hand, if a significant share of players, who made a selfish choice at the first phase, subscribe to an equal division principle at the second phase, then we have a clear empirical basis against which conformist theory can be tested. We have simply to see whether the mere fact of a 'constitutional' agreement over rules -which opens the door to the opportunity to play again a beneficial division game at phase two -is capable to activate motivational forces that will drive players to conform with the agreed principle (granted that players entertain the appropriate beliefs), changing their conduct with respect to how the behaved in the first phase. 8 Thus, our second prediction is crucial to the falsification power of our experiment.
Prediction 2. In phase two, a rule that assigns equal payoffs to all the players will be chosen by a significant part of the participants.
8 Note that this implies that only a subset of the observations consistent with the theory may have crucial discriminating force amongst different theoretical hypotheses over rational action, and we mainly are interested to produce exactly this kind of evidence. This would have justified us also in stressing a bit more the ethical nature of the second phase decision in order to test the level of conformism in the third phase.
Assume that the players have now reached phase three. Hence they must have been able to agree on the same principle and rule. If this is enough for them to believe that a chosen principle and rule will also be played by the other players who have agreed on the same principle and rule, then their reciprocity-based conformist preferences will be activated (both deviations from conformity indexes are close to zero), granted that exogenous weights attached to non material motivations are significant. Hence, a conformist player will comply with the principle and the rule. If we hypothesize that the exogenous weight of conformist motivation is a psychological feature widespread in the population, and granted that we predict that a significant part of the players will have chosen an equal division rule, then we must expect a significant number of them to choose strategy '4'. What is most important, however, is that, if the players are conformist, we must expect the largest part of those who agreed on the equal division principle and rule to comply with the rule in the third phase, if
we have some evidence that they believe that the rule will be followed by the others.
Moreover, if these players are told that most of the players implement the principle and the rule (in a way that backs the relevant belief), then, if they are truly conformist, they will be more motivated to play in accordance with the principle and the rule themselves.
Prediction 3. Players with conformist preferences who (having agreed on a rule) predict an outcome of the game compatible with a belief about the opponent's willingness to implement
the agreed rule, will implement the rule as well.
Prediction 4. Given predictions 2 and 3, a significant part of players (endowed with conformist preferences) will request '4'. Moreover most of the player (endowed with conformist preferences) who behaved according to prediction 2 and satisfy prediction 3, will
request '4' in the third phase.
Prediction 5. Once conformist players learn that a large part of the players that have chosen the rule acted in accordance with predictions 3 and 4, they will continue to request '4'
thereafter.
Alternative predictions
Let us now ask what kind of results can be expected from application of models based on a different characterisation of players' motivational complexity. Before we discuss the experimental results, we will answer this question by briefly considering two alternative approaches: the "inequity aversion" theory devised by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and the model of reciprocity introduced by Rabin (1993) .
Inequity aversion in the Exclusion Game
The idea at the basis of Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model is that agents suffer from both advantageous and (to a greater extent) disadvantageous inequality. Mathematically, given n players, the utility function of player i is: However, the distinguishing feature of this model is that according to it there should be no differences at all between the way the game is played in the first phase and the way it is played in the third phase of the experiment. In other words, phase 2 is irrelevant to this model.
Reciprocity in the Exclusion Game
Rabin (1993) conceives a model of choice in which the agent's utility depends both on his material payoff ( i π ) and on a measure of reciprocal kindness ( Rabin, 1993 ( Rabin, :1286 ( Rabin, -1287 ). In particular, player i judges his own kindness i f toward j, given his strategy i a and his beliefs j b about j 's strategy, as the distance between the payoff he gives to j and an equitable payoff -which is defined as the average between the maximum and the minimum payoffs that he 9 The strategy vector (4,4) is a Nash equilibrium if Rabin provides a theoretical framework that has also proved very useful in developing the model of choice subject to the experimentation described here Sacconi 2002, 2005) . To be noted, however, is that the basic difference between the notions of fairness incorporated into the indexes of 'conformity' (Sacconi and Grimalda) or 'kindness' (Rabin) used by the two theories respectively generates a sharp difference in the players' expected behaviours in our experimental game. Assuming Rabin's model of motivation we would predict (6,6) as the unique fairness equilibrium of the Exclusion Game, both in phase one and three. To see this, consider the fact that in the Exclusion Games active players are the dictators in a standard Dictator Game. Each of them is endowed with a sum of R/2 and has to decide how much of that sum to give to the third player; but his own payoff does not depend upon the action of the other active player. As a consequence, the two kindness measures are both equal to zero. This is due to the fact that what Rabin understands to be fairness is in fact a direct and reciprocal attitude of kindness shown by the actions that players undertake directly toward each other and vice versa. This is a personal relationship and a personally orientated attitude.
By contrast, the model of conformist preferences is based on an impersonal and impartial principle of fairness chosen under an hypothesis of symmetry and exchangeability of personal places, which must be applied to whichever player is affected by the real game in whatever 
Results
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General description of behaviours
We begin with a general description of the subjects' behaviour. In order to be clear, let us remind that each subject plays two rounds of the game in phase 1, and then (if he is not selected to be a dummy player) he plays again twice (we call these 'times') the basic game in phase three. In the first phase subjects played once in the G1 role and once in the G2 role.
Considering all the 90 subjects involved in the three sessions (Figure 7 12 ), we observed that a large majority of players (54.4%) chose to ask for six euros when playing in both the G1 and G2 roles, leaving nothing for the third player. About one third of the subjects made different choices in the two symmetrical roles G1 and G2, choosing to ask for 6 euros as G1 (G2) and 4 euros as G2 (G1). Although we cannot completely exclude the possibility of confusion, a look at the questionnaires suggests that this particular behaviour can be explained mostly in terms of regret, which induced subjects to adjust, in the second round, the choice made in the first round.
Jumping for a moment to phase three, it will be seen that some players were assigned the role of the dummy player. As a consequence, because they never played during this phase, their
behavior cannot be compared with their behaviour in the first phase. The remaining players instead took an active role in both rounds of the third phase. Hence, if we want to compare the results of phase one and phase three, we must limit our analysis to the 60 subjects that played in G1 or G2 in this phase (Figure 8 ). Three main facts emerge from comparison between the two distributions: first, moving from phase 1 to phase 3 there is a significant growth of the share of subjects who asked for 4 euros at both the first and the second time they played in phase 3. Second, the percentage of subjects that chose to keep the maximum amount for themselves (6 euros) in both the rounds of the first phase did not greatly differ from the percentage of players who decided to ask for 6 euros in both the two rounds of the third phase. Finally, we can observe a shift from the unimodal distribution of the first phase's choice to the clearly bimodal distribution of the choices of the third phase, in which only a negligible number of subjects asked for different amounts in the two rounds. Table 1 gives a more detailed picture of this polarization between the "4,4" and the "6,6" choices.
14 Table 1 . 14 To test whether a difference exists between the choices in phase 1 (before agreement on the rule) and those in phase three (after agreement on the rule) we can distinguish between equity oriented choices, corresponding to "Class E= ask for '4' at least once, but do not ask for '6' " and more self-interest-oriented choices, corresponding to "Class S= asks for '6' at least once". We can introduce the null hypothesis that the number of subjects that move from Class E to Class S is the same as the number of subjects moving from Class S to Class E. 
Choices in phase I and III ( N=60)
Phase
Choice and implementation of the division rule
Inspection of the data in phase two, when the subjects are requested to agree over a principle and a division rule, shows that 19 of the 30 groups (57 subjects) chose principle 1 and rule (33%, 33%, 33%), 10 groups ( 30 subjects) chose principle 2 and rule (50%, 50%, 0%) and only one group (3 subjects) chose principle 2 and rule ( 50%, 33%, 17%).
Unanimity on a general principle for each group was reached within a maximum of three trials, with a large majority of groups reaching agreement in the first trial. The maximum number of trials required to reach unanimous agreement on a specific division rule was seven, 15 but most groups did not go beyond the first trial.
With regard to active players, 24 of the 38 who chose the (33%, 33%, 33%) rule decided to implement it at both times they played in the third phase. Rule (50%, 50%, 0%) was implemented by 19 of the 20 active players belonging to the groups that selected that rule (Table 2 ). Only one of the two members with an active role , who agreed on the (50%, 33%, 17%) rule, decided to implement it at both times of third phase (Table 2) . At both times of phase three, almost all the players that implemented the rule (both the rules)
predicted an outcome of the game compatible with reciprocal conformity. On the other hand, 15 Reached only by the members of the group that agreed on the (50%, 33%, 17%) rule.
almost all the players who decided not to conform with the rule predicted that their opponents would do the same (see Appendix 3 for details).
Forty four players (73%) made correct predictions about the willingness of the opponent to conform with the rule. As shown by the data, information about the percentage of players that chose to implement the rule the first time, had no effect on their choice at the second time of this phase. It is not troubling however, in that this information largely confirmed their initial prediction (those who predicted conformity first time conformed and then received the information that most of other players had conformed), so that there was no reason to make a change in their beliefs.
Indentifying the players with conformist preferences
The most interesting fact emerging from these data is the significat change from a situation in which most players chose a strategy compatible with the pursuit of their self interest, asking for half of the sum for themselves and leaving nothing for the third player, to a situation in which there was a significant growth in the propensity to choose an equal division by implementing a widely shared rule of equal distribution of the benefits. This shift becomes particularly clear if, considering only the 60 subjects with an active role in the third phase, we look at the behaviour of the 51 of them (85%) that asked for 6 euros in at least one of the rounds of the first phase, so taking a decision that cannot dsicriminate between the two selfinterest and conformistic preferences hypotheses (Figure 9 ). Indeed, we can observe that 31 of them chose the (33%, 33%, 33%) rule in the second phase, 19 of these implemented it in the third phase, with 17 believing that their opponents would do the same. Eight of the remaining 11 subjects who decided to ask for the maximum amount did not believe that their opponents would implement the rule.
17 of the 18 players who agreed on the (50%, 50%, 0) rule implemented it expecting the same behaviour by their opponents.
Following the choices of this class of subjects through the three phases of the experiment, we can conclude that at least 16 of them (one third of all the active players who asked for 6 euros in at least one of the rounds of the first phase) made choices that can be considered perfectly compatible with our hypotheses (boxes with thick borders in figure 9 ). Indeed, the change in their behaviour from phase 1 to phase 2 can be attributed to the activation of conformist motives due to the introduction of a shared non-binding rule of division and to the emergence of beliefs about reciprocal conformity.
In addition, 8 of the 12 (11 in the second round) players that decided not to implement the 33%, 33%, 33% rule did so believing that the counterpart would do the same.
This last observation does not conflict with the conformist preferences hypothesis. However, because it is also compatible with the assumption that players are characterized by selfinterest, it does not allow us to identify pure-conformist players. The same can be said with regard to the 15 players who decided to implement the ( 50%, 50%, 0) rule expecting the same behaviour by their opponents (boxes with dotted borders in figure 9 ). 
Conclusions
We can summarize our results by saying that at least one third of the players who were always active behaved and asked for 6 euros in at least one of the rounds of the first phase were motivated by conformist preferences, while the remaining subjects can be identified as being either self-interested or conformist. Only four players displayed behavior compatible with the inequity-averse hypothesis. In particular, with respect to our empirical predictions:
i) The observation that most players chose strategy '6' in both the rounds of the first phase is compatible with prediction 1.
ii) The fact that, in the second phase, a large number of players agreed on the (33%, 33%, 33%) rule is compatible with predictions 2.
iii) For a significant number of subjects, having agreed on a rule seems to have been sufficient reason to generate expectations about reciprocal conformity. These results allow us concluding that the experimental evidence backs the Sacconi and Grimalda's model of choice based on conformist preferences and comprehensive utility functions. The significant shift in the behaviour of the players in the transition from phase one to phase three is strictly consistent with the hypothesis that, having these subject realised that the constitutional nature of the choice in phase two asked for a fairness principle of conduct incompatible with their behaviour in phase 1, the very fact of having agreed on that principle activated their conformist motivation to conform with it, granted that they believed that the same principle was conformed by the counterparties. Notice that, whereas the players changing their behaviour crucially corroborate the theory, also most of players that exhibit the same behaviour in phase one and three (given their choice in phase two and their beliefs), are consistent with the theory (i.e. do not provide any anomaly to the model). This cannot be said for the concurrent models we considered, which cannot explain our data. With regard to these alternative theories, in fact, we can conclude that: a) Models of inequity-aversion fail to explain the observation of different behaviours in phase one and in phase three by the same subjects. Why should the subjects be inequity averse in the third phase if they were not so motivated in the first? This finding may be explained within the "inequity -aversion" framework by saying that the introduction of phase two, modelled as a constitutional choice, induced a change in the definition of the reference group, inducing subjects that in the first phase did not consider the payoff of the dummy as relevant to include it instead in the third phase. However, this explanation would make the inequity-aversion approach closely akin to the conformist preference model, where players that consider the advantage connected to the constitution of a social union (that is, the advantage of being allowed to play the game because of agreement on a rule) develop the motivational basis for a change in their behaviour (but consider that we found that players' action also depended on their beliefs concerning the reciprocity of the counterpart, an aspect that does not have any significant role in the inequity-aversion model).
b) 'Direct reciprocity' models, or reciprocity models based on 'direct kindness', fail to predict the dramatic change in the behaviour pattern shown by subjects between the first phase, when it in fact accords with the direct kindness prediction, to the third one, when it diverges substantially. Note that dummy players did not change their status during the process that took the player from phase one to phase three, i.e. at the last step there were still dummy players, and they could not manifest direct attitude or intention toward the active players since they simply do not make decisions. Nevertheless, having a rule in mind, one that has been agreed even if not binding or exogenously enforced, seems to be enough to change the players' behaviour significantly. This suggests that some sort of commitment to the principle itself, and beliefs concerning reciprocal conformity with it, has motivational effects. , then i 's 1 st order belief must assign probability 1 to the fact that j plays that strategy with probability 1, and 0 to the other strategies. Furthermore, given the equilibrium strategy i σ of player i, and given the usual assumption of common knowledge of players' rationality , i must expect j to have the same rational beliefs, coherently with the fact that i plays i σ with probability 1. This means that i 's 2 nd order beliefs must assign probability 1 to the fact that j believes that i plays i σ . More generally, in equilibrium, all the 1 st order beliefs must be single-point distributions assigning probability 1 to the equilibrium strategy. 
Condition (ii) is a restatement of the standard Nash equilibrium condition affirming that the equilibrium strategy must assign a payoff no smaller than the ones attained by any other feasible strategy, given the opponent's strategy and the beliefs. Condition (i) requires the beliefs to be coherent with the equilibrium strategy. Note that if beliefs are not part of the ++ This appendix draws on Sacconi and Grimalda (2003) utility function then condition (i) becomes redundant and the definition boils down to the standard Nash equilibrium definition.
Appendix 2. Voting Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to five groups with three members (identified with the numbers from 1 to 5). Each member could read the number of his group on his computer screen but could not interact with the other members, nor identify them.
The experimenter distributed a form like the one in figure 1a
Figure 1a: Form for the general principle selection
The subjects were asked to fill in the " ID " and "Group's number" box and to select their preferred principle by ticking one of the two boxes in the "Player's choice" column. The experimenters collected the forms and checked the votes, writing on each player's form the choices of the other members of the group. If the members of some groups did not reach unanimous agreement, the experimenter again distributed the forms to all the subjects. Members of the groups that did not reach agreement were asked to vote again, while the others had to wait. The experimenter collected the forms, checked the votes and repeated the same procedure until all the groups had reached agreement. The maximum number of trials allowed was five.
After the voting for selection of the general principle new forms like the ones in figures 2a
and 3a were distributed. These stated particular division rules deduced from the general principle. Each subject received a form stating the rules deduced from the principle selected in the previous stage. The voting procedure was the same as the one adopted for the principles selections, but the maximum number of trials was now ten. At the end of the voting procedure, the experimenter? inserted the rule selected in a form that appeared on the screen of each subject. (2) The first number corresponds to the strategy of the first player, the second number to the strategy of the second player. Thus 66 means that the player, that plausibly has choosen the stratefy 6, expect the same choice by his counterpart.
(1) In phase 1 each subject plays under both the two roles (G1 and G2); the grey raws refer to player that do not have an active role in phase 3
